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THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF MORRIS R. COHEN
HUNTINGTON CAIRNS*

I

If the classical tradition in philosophy be defined as the doctrine
that general principles operate in nature, then Morris Cohen was
undoubtedly the foremost representative of that view in contemporary American thought. In the American speculative world, it is an
unfashionable position. The chief characteristic of American thought
is its anti-metaphysical bias, as represented by the varieties of positivism that dominate nearly all branches of inquiry. Nevertheless,
it is an inexplicable feature of American philosophy that Cohen
shares with John Dewey the distinction of being the most popularly
influential of contemporary thinkers. It has become the habit nowadays to observe that there is a dearth of original ideas in his works;
he is regarded as having had no impulse towards novelty, nor any
desire to found a new philosophical system. Cohen himself, in a
passage of strong autobiographical overtones, once offered the same
observation about Spinoza. He suggested that the large impression
Spinoza had made was due to the singular purity of his light, and
the way in which traditional ideas were fused into a coherent whole
by the fire of his concentrated intellectual energy that kindled a lyric
ardor for human well-being.' The same observation could be made
of Cohen's own work. But it is an underestimation to hold that he
did nothing more.
His life effort was devoted to the discovery of the logical presuppositions of scientific method. His equipment for this task was
unrivaled. He was endowed with a mind of exceptional philosophical power, and he made it his business to have at his command all
the tools that he felt were necessary for his work. He was at home
in Greek and Latin as well as the principal European languages; his
knowledge of the history of science was exceptional; he was able
to follow mathematical arguments of the, utmost profundity; his
grasp of other subject matters-physics, logic, psychology, history,
economics, law-was always at the professional level. He did not
hesitate, when he regarded formal instruction as necessary-as in
law-to subject himself to the discipline of the expert training of
the professional schools. The outcome was an exposition in scores of
articles, now collected in a dozen or so volumes, of the nature of
* Secretary-Treasurer and General Counsel, National Gallery of Art, Washingtbn, D.C. Author, Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel (1949).
1. COHEN, THE FAiTH OF A LiBERAL 13 (1946).
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scientific method, which, for richness of content and acuteness of insight, probably stands alone on the shelf of volumes devoted to that
treacherous subject. To the works of no other writer is it possible to
turn for a more comprehensive or a more penetrating account of
scientific method in its manifestations in so many fields.
At the outset of his speculative career Cohen found himself repelled
by the tenets of the two commanding camps. He rejected NeoHegelianism and all other forms of metaphysics which purported to
test the discoveries of the natural sciences by theological, social or
other like standards. It seemed to him that if there were such a
thing as knowledge the conclusions reached by science were probably
closer to it than those reached in any other department. He rejected
the views of the positivists and other allied approaches which
attempted to eliminate metaphysics; their efforts to dispose of the
problems of reality appeared to him naive. Science was occupied
with specific discoveries; no general physics, neither that of Descartes
nor Newton, attempted to account for the world in its entirety. His
repudiation of Neo-Hegelianism involved also the rejection of the
view that the world was an absolute totality and the Hegelian denial
of the reality of abstractions. Our knowledge of the world in its
totality is fragmentary, and in what sense it has a unity-if it has
one-we do not know. His repudiation of positivism also caused
him to refuse to attempt to construct the world from atomic data.
It appeared to him that every element had a domain in which its
true existence was beyond itself, i.e., the larger system of which it
was a part. His refusal to accept the two current explanations left
him, however, with what seemed the major problem of the meaning
of science still unsolved: Why should we accept the admittedly
fragmentary and incomplete conclusions of science as valid? We
ought not to accept the report on the nature of the elephant from
the seven blind men who each examined a part of its anatomy.
Further, how was it possible that the jigsaw pieces of the different
sciences fitted into a picture, as science developed?
It did not seem to Cohen, as it has to so many philosophers since
Locke, that the solution might lie through the tortuous paths of
epistemology. He was inclined to regard the bulk of contemporary
writing on that subject as inspired merely by professional interests,
although he recognized that the existence in the universe of knowledge itself was a fact fpr which philosophy must account. .However,
he followed Hegel in holding that we are justified in examining the
ontological realm without 'worryng--to6 .much about the tasks set
xs by the theory of knowledge. 'He thought the assumption that we
can know only our own ideas is;a-d6gmatism that involves an infinite
regress. Since it was difficult to see how awareness of a given entity
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could determine any one known trait more than any other, it was
safer to assume that awareness did not determine any of the objects'
specific characteristics. This hypothesis left him free to search for
the most general formula for the nature of things without undue
emphasis upon the fact of knowledge.
Nevertheless, at one period in his life he studied Hume with great
attention, and also Kant's effort to solve Hume's problem. Hume's
theory seemed to him to issue in a flat contradiction. If we assume
the mind knows its own impressions only, then we cannot logically
know that there is an external world that produces or causes those
impressions. Further, Hume described causality as the habitual succession of impressions in our minds; but this does not describe the
relation between the external world that causes impressions and the
impressions of the mind. Hume's contradictions appeared to Cohen
to arise because he had assumed both that the mind knows nothing
but its own impressions, and also that we know that our individual
mind is only one among other objects in the universe. If the second
assumption is true the first must be false; but the assumption of the
existence of the larger world is involved in our very discussion, and
therefore the mind cannot be limited to a knowledge of its own
impressions only. In addition, that which is known is always more
than the mere knowing activity itself, otherwise there could be no
present recognition of past thoughts.2
It was the study of Russell's Principlesof Mathematics that brought
all the threads together for him. The classical realism at the basis
of the book convinced him of the reality of abstract or mathematical
relations. Russell has since given up this view, but, as Cohen once
remarked, Mohammed kept the faith even though Allah himself
departed from it.3 To Cohen the circumstance that pure mathematics
asserts only logical implications, and that such logical implications
or relations cannot be identified with either psychologic or physical
events, but are determinates of both, seemed to him to offer a wellgrounded and fruitful starting point for philosophy. 4 It at once ruled
out for him the empiricism of Mill, since relations if they exist in
the mind only cannot connect things external to the mind; it also
ruled out the effort to locate relations in an absolute totality that
is beyond the grasp of the mind and therefore of no explanatory
value. On the positive side, the doctrine, since it constitutes a ground
for the procedures of scientific method generally, permitted him to
take full advantage of the remarkable developments of science. It
led him also to return to what constituted the concern of classical
2. COHEN, STUDIES IN PHIosoPHY AND SCIENCE 6 (1949).
3. A TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR MORRIS RAPHAEL; COHEN 70 (1928).
4. COHEN, op. cit. supranote 2, at 7.
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philosophy before it became preoccupied with the problem of knowledge-mathematics, physics, biology, psychology, ethics, law, art,
religion and history. In philosophy proper it enabled him in the
course of his extensive writings to raise almost every methodological
question of importance, and it resulted in the composition of the
long series of articles, now collected in various books, which constitute one of the treasure stores of the subject.
At the same time, notwithstanding his intense concern with
abstract thought, he was equally occupied with the problem of human
existence. No doubt his background contributed to this interest. He
was born in Minsk, Russia on July 25, 1880, and was educated in the
traditional manner of the Orthodox Jews of Eastern Europe. His
love of philosophy was awakened in him as a boy by his grandfather,
a poor tailor in the Russian town of Nesviesk. "Though he never
learned to write and had only a moderate reading knowledge of
Hebrew," Cohen wrote,5 "he had become the master of an extraordinary amount of knowledge and wisdom. Walks and talks with
him stimulated my imagination about the world at large and its
history. From him, also, I acquired a certain ineradicable admiration
for the ascetic virtues and a scorn for the life of wealth, ease, creature comforts, and all that goes under the old name of worldliness."
It was from his grandfather's lips that he first heard of Aristotle as
well as Maimonides, and of Napoleon's campaign in Russia, some
monuments of which, in the form of earthworks, were still visible
outside the town. After he came to the United States at the age of
twelve his interest in the Socialist Labor Party led him to technical
philosophy. As a college student he read Das Kapital and other
socialist classics. He was gripped by the references in Marx and
Engels to Hegel's dialectical method, and he felt that the fundamental
issue between individualism and socialism was inextricably bound up
with the difference between the psychologic and inductive method
represented by Mill and the dialectic and historical method of Marx
and Engels.
His interest in the abstract when coupled with his concern for
human welfare gave to all his studies their chief characteristic. For
the most part the authors of works in logic, physics, jurisprudence
and other branches of inquiry are more occupied with the development of their premises and the exhibition of the links between their
deductions than in strengthening the foundations of their superstructures. Cohen's entire effort was devoted to the foundations. He
endeavored always to isolate the fundamental problems which lay
at the roots of the various disciplines, and to show the consequences
5. Id. at 3.
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of the different purported solutions. Whenever those problems
touched upon the affairs of human life that fact was also always
present to his mind and the connections were duly weighed. Fichte's
idea that his own theory of law needed to be worked out on several
planets for its full implications to be seen was simple nonsense to
Cohen.
II
Cohen's own work in law is an illustration of his basic position. His
initial interest in law was due to his dissatisfaction with the course
of judicial decisions in labor cases. The prevailing doctrine held that
judges declared or discovered law and did not make it. His attempt
to meet this contention led him in turn to re-examine the distinction
between realism and idealism when it turned on the issue whether
the mind makes or discovers the nature of the world. He came
finally to the position that the distinction was not an absolute one.
His legal philosophy was a mixture of both formal and material
elements, but at bottom it was dominantly social. In his view human
beings cannot live together without restraints upon their anarchic
impulses. We therefore have laws which secure obedience because
their ultimate appeal is to the community. This, of course, leaves
open the ancient problem of the necessary insufficiency of general
rules when applied to particular cases. Cohen recognized that many
things must be left to the discretion of well-disposed and competent
officials. Law for the most part is not self-executing and government
must be administered by men with personal inclinations and desires.
The essential problem, therefore, is to discover means of guarding
against arbitrary and tyrannical abuse of the discretion which must
necessarily be entrusted to judges and other officials. At this point
his general standpoint again came to the fore. The solution to the
entire problem, he thought, was to find the reason or rule in sound
discretion.
His study of labor decisions led him to a consideration of the
moral basis of the American Bill of Rights, on which the cases
turned. This caused him to re-examine the whole question of natural
law. His point of departure was the conception that in its essence the
doctrine of natural law, in all its forms, turns on the appeal from the
law that is to the law that ought to be. He held that the principles
of natural law are not, of course, self-evident, and when formulated
must be defended on the basis that they establish a system of law
which is preferable to that which can possibly be established on
the basis of their denial. They must be tested in the same manner
as all other scientific hypotheses, namely, by their certainty, accuracy,
universality, and coherency. Cohen thought that several serious diffi-
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culties stood in the way of the formulation of a valid theory of
natural law. First, the ideals that we do set up are so hazy that their
application does not solve the problems the law must, face. Thus
the classical legal definition of justice makes it consist in rendering
everyone his own. But what is rightly anybody's own is precisely
the problem the law must determine according to some principle of
justice. If this is not the case, the just and the legal are identical and
the possibility of unjust law is eliminated. Cohen was of the opinion
that no ideal so far suggested was both formally necessary and
materially adequate to determine definitely which of our actually
conflicting interests should justly prevail. 6 Second, there are inherent
limits to the legislative power, inherent difficulties in forcing obedience to the law, and limits to the effectiveness of legal machinery,
which must all be understood before a rational system of natural
law is possible. As Spinoza 7 observed, "he who tries to fix and determine everything by law will inflame rather than correct the vices
of the world." Lastly, the third limitation of legal idealism is due
to the fact that legal practice must operate with abstract general
rules.8 Cohen points out that the attempt to correct the legal system
by some form of individualization, or equity, must itself be subject
to rules or else it remains lawless. His final admonition was to recall
the ancient wisdom that it is romantic foolishness to expect that man
by his own weak efforts can make a heaven on earth. But it is the
essence of human dignity, Cohen held,9 to wear out our lives in the
pursuit of worthy though imperfectly attainable ideals.
III
Cohen was drawn to the study of legal philosophy not only for its
own sake but in part for its bearing on philosophy in general. He
saw legal inquiry as a field of thought amenable to logical procedure
and containing within itself philosophical problems of a most profound nature. He was distressed that so rich a subject matter should
be neglected by professional philosophers. He argued that the
meaning of many doctrines in the history of philosophy itself could
not be grasped without an understanding of their connections with
legal speculation. The Aristotelian and Stoic theories of nature and
its laws, the character of the Leibnizian monadology, and Kant's
Summum Bonum, are unintelligible unless account is taken of their
legal settings.'0 But his specific appeal to his philosophical colleagues
6. CoHEN, REASON AND NATURE 419 (1931).
7. SPiNozA, TRACTATUS THEOL. POLIT. ch. 20. Quoted in COHEN, REASON
NATURE 423 (1931).
8. COHEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 425.
9. Id. at 426.
10. COHEN, REASON AND LAW 130 (1950).
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to once again turn their attention to the legal domain was on the
level of usefulness. If philosophers would avail themselves of the
large amount of material at hand in the law it would enrich their
insights and bolster their teaching in logic, epistemology, and metaphysics.
In logic Cohen complained of the use of such elementary biologic
propositions as "all men are mortal." He saw law as the only social
institution that is mainly a deductive system, or employs predominantly the logic of subsumption. Mill had held that the laws of
evidence were of the essence of logic, and Cohen remarks that
neither Mill nor any other logician had taken the trouble to observe
how the evidentiary laws had been worked out under the pressure
of life's demands." It is in fact a source of wonderment that logicians
for the most part have neglected the field of evidence, or the rules
of real property and contract, in the employment of illustrative material, since there is at hand here a wealth of deductive practice which
could animate many a dull page. However, the criticism is unfair
to Mill. In preparing Bentham's five volumes on the Rationale of
Judicial Evidence for the press Mill had attempted to master the
whole of the English law of evidence as a necessary preliminary to
his task. Years later in his own Logic he drew on legal material
when appropriate to his discussion, as in his argument that scientific
method is applicable not only to nature but to all other subject
matters including, specifically, law. 12 Further, he saw law as not
the only social institution which availed itself of the logic of subsumption. In attempting to establish the doctrine that all inference
is from particulars to particulars Mill was forced to meet the general
propositions of revealed religion as well as those of positive law. 13
Cohen also urged logicians to examine the results reached by jurists
in their own analyses of logical processes. No logician has yet
accepted this suggestion, but it still remains an important one. The
conclusions arrived at in logical studies are purportedly general in
nature and hence should fit the circumstances of the legal order.
But in actual fact they do not always do so, and the struggles of
Jhering and others to develop more pertinent theories are perhaps
capable of suggesting something of importance to logic itself.
No juristic problem has closer connections with philosophical
thought than the issue of the achievement of justice through the rule
14
of law or through the medium of expert officials. Although Plato
believed that as a general rule it was advisable to observe the law,
11. Id. at 131.
12. MILL, A SYSTEM
13. Id. at 130.

14.

OF LoGic 447

PLATO, STATESMAN 300.

(1864).
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he thought it would be ruinous if magistrates were not permitted to
decide cases without regard to the law when they were able to offer
something better. His argument rested on the analogy of the physician and the pilot who must be free to act in accordance with the
facts of each situation. Aristotle 5 concluded that the law should be
supreme and that magistrates should act on their own initiative only
in cases where the law is silent.
Philosophically the issue is between rationalism and empiricism.
The notion that justice can be achieved empirically through the
device of permitting the judge to decide each case on its own merits
is unrealistic. Power not subject to external restraints may be wilfully abused. In addition, before they act men must know with
some measure of certainty what is permissible and what is not.
However, if rationalism regards all concepts as unchangeable entities
independent of their actual context, rules are likely to become an end
in themselves and the results are frequently in flagrant disregard of
the ends of justice. 16 In modern times in the United States Pound
was the leader in the fight against this form of intellectualism, which
he termed mechanical jurisprudence, and Cohen was a close second.
Aristotle is evidence that this aberration is not wholly modern. Under
Greek law if a plaintiff sued for 20 minae when but 18 were proved
to be due him, the finding would have to be for the defendant.
Against the proposal of Hippodamus to correct this and allow a verdict for the amount proved due, Aristotle answered that "a judge
who votes acquittal decides, not that the defendant owes nothing, but
that he does not owe the 20 minae claimed.' 1 Comparable doctrines
obtained in the English common law for centuries and were not
overcome until ethical considerations were balanced against the law's
pure formalism.
On the ground of the inseparability of two dominant impulses in
human life, the desire for novelty and the desire for order, Cohen
did not commit himself to either the rule of law or the rule of the
just man.18 The same result was reached by Pound through the
Bergsonian notions of intelligence and intuition. The former gives
us the mechanical rule applicable to the security of acquisitions and
transactions where every promissory note is like every other, every
fee simple like every other. The latter allows for the more or less
trained instinct of the experienced magistrate in such a field as
negligence, where no two cases have been alike or ever will be alike. 19
15.

ARISTOTLE,

Library, 1947).

PoLrncs, bk. 3, ch. 10; 1281 a34-39. (McKeon ed., Modern

16. COHEN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 132.
17. ARISTOTLE, Poinmcs, bk. 3, ch. 10; 1268 b15 (McKeon ed., Modem Li-

brary, 1947).

18. COHEN, LAw AN THE SOCIAL ORDER 266 (1933).
19. POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 70 (1954).
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In truth the legal dilemma represents an issue that all fundamental
subjects have had to face and none has resolved. In art it takes the
form of classicism versus romanticism, in religion in America of
fundamentalism versus modernism, in science of reason versus empiricism. In law, which is the art of adjusting the claims of the commonweal to the claims of the individual, the quandary is particularly
pressing. The legal system must provide assurances on the basis of
which men can act, yet it must not stand in the way of more satisfactory solutions to the old way of doing things.
Throughout his philosophical writings generally Cohen conducted
a continuous war against the kind of empiricism, or sensationalism,
which holds nothing real except sensible entities that have a position
in time and space. He thought that if philosophers would only
examine the nature of legal rights or obligations, the characteristics
of debt and property, they would find that these are real in any sense
in which the word real is worth anything. He observed that a contingent right to receive a dividend may fetch more in the open
market than the chairs, desks, tables or bedposts which seem to be
all the furniture at the philosopher's disposal.2 0
For Cohen the point of these examples, which in themselves might
seem insignificant, is that the attempt to understand the meaning
of fundamental concepts and methods of science cannot be carried
on without a Weltanschauung or at least a system of values. In that
task the philosophy of law is inescapably an integral part. The
validity of this position, however, is dependent on the level at which
the discourse is conducted. By temperament and intellectual inclination Cohen was possessed of a deep ethical sense and a concern for
the world's affairs. However much he might respect him, his own
attitude was largely foreign to the seeker after truth solely for its
own sake, who even rejoices in the belief that his inquiries can have
no practical applications. This subject, Hardy2 ' wrote of pure mathematics, has no practical use; that is to say, it cannot be used directly
for the destruction of human life or for accentuating the present
inequalities in the distribution of wealth. Cohen's position, although
he nowhere touched upon it specifically, would undoubtedly be that
the affirmation of any ultimate proposition, such as that the world
is intelligible, necessarily implied particular ethical and political
consequences. Whatever others might do he himself was always
inclined to draw those consequences. In that enterprise he was unquestionably correct in his insistence upon the great value of the
legal experience as an end in the clarification of the issues at stake.
This saved Cohen from the extreme formalism of Kelsen, Kaufmann,
20. Id. at 133.

21. HARDY, A MATHEmATICIAN'S APOLOGY 60 (1940).
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and others, who, on the analogy of mathematical physics, attempted
to derive substantive rules of law from purely formal or logical principles. Cohen rejected the analogy since it was really against them.
Pure mathematics makes no assumptions with respect to existence,
and it is therefore impossible to derive any conclusions about existence from it. However, mathematical physics does make such assumptions. That is the exact point of difference between the two fields.
It is a logical absurdity to find positive rules of law by quasi-mathematical methods in principles devoid of material content.22
IV
One of the major concerns of Cohen's life was the meaning of
scientific method. He gave it more attention than he gave any other
subject, and its principles were always part of his approach to any
of the numerous topics on which he wrote. He distinguished science
from ordinary common-sense knowledge by the severity with which
it pursued the ideal of certainty, exactness, universality and truth.
Although he described himself on several occasions as a "stray dog
unchained to any metaphysical kennel" 23 his outlook was pronouncedly anti-positivist and anti-nominalist. There was a strong sceptical
strain in him, but it never amounted to universal scepticism. He
could not believe that as human beings we start with absolute certainties; at the best we initiate our inquiries with hypotheses or
guesses suggested generally by tradition and previous knowledge,
but not on that account necessarily free from error. His attitude was
not dissimilar to that of a late Chief Justice of the United States who,
upon being faced with a proposition upon which he wished to reflect,
would remark: "Let us take it over to the light and look at it." For
Cohen the great lesson of scientific method was not that traditional
views are fallible, but that the way to truth is to treat a proposition
as one among a number of possible views and compare it with
others. He objected with particular force to the practice of the
courts in appealing to such premises as "requirements which shock
the sense of justice," 24 and then proceeding to deduce from them
conclusions of grave social consequence. He looked to logic and
scientific method as the best sources for correctives to judicial habits
of this sort.
It is convenient to look at Cohen's views on this subject under
three headings: (1) the extent to which law is amenable to scientific
method; (2) the status of universals, positivism, and the normative
22. CoHEN, op. cit. supranote 18, at 196.
23. CoHEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3.
24. People ex rel. Hotchkiss v. Smith, 206 N.Y. 231, 242, 99 N.E. 568, 572
(1912).

1960]

M. R. COHEN

in legal thinking; and (3) law as a deductive system. In Cohen's
outlook not only would the philosopher benefit by taking account of
legal materials, but it was of equal or greater importance for the
legal theorist to have an understanding grasp of philosophical and
scientific techniques.
(1) Scientific method in Cohen's approach was relevant to law both
as an intellectual ideal and as a social activity. As an intellectual
ideal Cohen's plea for a place for scientific method in the law was a
simple one: It enables us to see legal systems as a whole and the
relations between their parts, and to that extent it thus increases
the effectiveness of the legal system itself. In primitive law, that
is in all legal systems where Greek science is unknown, we are
in the presence of miscellaneous rules either not arranged at all or
else held together under rudimentary rubrics. In legal systems influenced by Greek science there is an attempt to reduce the law to
a small number of general principles from which all possible cases
can be reached. The Federal Internal Revenue Code is a modern
example of the former, and the great treatises of Williston and Wigmore of the latter. Something more than a sound classification is
aimed at in a scientific system. It seeks to establish intrinsic connections in its subject matter so that all the ideas of the system are
shown to be connected in essence. In mathematics, logic, and certain
aspects of ethics, the success of this approach has been marked. At
bottom legal theory is analogous to those disciplines. Its inherent
function is the integration and amplification of ideas in relation to a
specific social subject matter, and as such it is strictly amenable to
scientific method.
Our appellate courts are constantly faced with the necessity of
deciding the most complex social issues when brought to them on
constitutional or other legal grounds. They come from the realm of
political theory, economics, sociology, criminology, even biology, as
in the sterilization cases. Of necessity the courts must pass upon the
issues thus arising on the basis of a few hours of oral argument and
briefs by lawyers. Many of the propositions urged upon the court
are supported by sound expert opinion in the fields from which they
originate; but on many important points there is a serious conflict
of opinion among the social scientists themselves. To meet this predicament Cohen modestly proposes that the law itself, in the persons
of jurists, judges, and advocates, have a trained sense of scientific
method.25 However, juristic thought in general has little for which
to apologize in this respect. From Roman days to the present the
law has given as good an account of itself in the field of scientific
25. CoHEN, op.

cit. supra note 18, at 187.
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method as any of the social sciences. If scientific method be taken
to mean the elaboration of the value of rival propositions and an
ultimate decision between them, then this was precisely the approach
of the Roman jurisconsults, the medieval lawyers, and the serious
legal students of today. The dialectical development of ideas has been
one of the major tasks of the law, and the law is perhaps the most
honorable exception to Poincar6's dictum that while physical scientists are busy solving their problems, social scientists are busy discussing their methods. This is not to say that amateurish views in
grave social matters are not to be found in the legal domain. This,
however, is an infirmity which some spokesmen of the law share
not only with some fellow practitioners in other social sciences, but
with eminent voices in that most exact of subjects, physics.
(2) The doctrine that universals exist as universals, not as additional individual things, that is they exist as qualities or relations of
things, Cohen believed to be demanded by actual legal procedure.
Metaphysically he thought it quite clear that universals exist in every
situation in which individual things can be said to exist, and by the
same evidence. If any statement of the sort "Smith is white and an
honest man" is true, whiteness, honesty, and manhood must exist
as truly as Smith. He did not hesitate to assert that an adequate
27
26
discussion of cases like Berry v. Donovan, Adair v. United States,
or Commonwealth v. Boston & M. R.R. 28 involves the whole medieval
controversy over the reality of universals. It is on this essentially
Aristotelian basis that Cohen conducted a lifelong polemic against
absolutisms in legal thought.
If we cannot separate the universal from the particular, if there
is no separate world of universals, then the universals with which
the law occupies itself are as mutable as the instances in which they
are embodied. Thus, Cohen denies that there can be only one true
or correct definition of any object. Maine would not accept the
Austinian definition of law as an imperative or command of the
sovereign on the ground that there are communities in which there
is no one who habitually issues commands that are generally obeyed,
and yet conduct in them is governed by some law. But as a matter
of fact in classical Rome and in modern states, which were the subject of Austin's analysis, the conditions of Austin's theory are fairly
met, and Maine does not refute Austin by showing that the word
"law" has a different meaning in a different context.29 Just as there is
a craving for absolute definitions, there is a similar craving for abso26. 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603 (1905).

27. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
28. 222 Mass. 206, 110 N.E. 264 (1915).
29. CoHF, op. cit. supranote 10, at 65.
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lute divisions, e.g., between the civil and the criminal law, between
public and private law, between substantive and procedural law, and
between judicial and administrative law. While these divisions are
a helpful device in the law, and perhaps even necessary so that we
can draw logical conclusions from them, nevertheless it is not difficult to show that in actual situations they are not as clear-cut as they
appear.3 0 Again, the law is studded with principles which have the
appearance of self-evident truths, e.g., that men desire their economic
advantage, and are deterred from actions to which penalties are
attached; that property should be protected; that men should be
equal before the law; that no man can be his own agent; that no
man can convey more or a greater estate than that which in law he
has; that no one can acquire a right by committing a wrong; that the
law is a closed or complete system of rules, so that no matter what
case comes up, a positive answer can be deduced from the principles embodied in statutes or in previously decided cases. Cohen will
allow no principles of this sort to be absolutely true.31 His method
of attack upon them is to show that the law always recognizes exceptions to them. Thus, in the case of the apparent truth that no one
can acquire a right by committing a wrong, nevertheless a thief does
acquire the right of possession against everyone except the owner,
and even against the latter after a certain lapse of time.
At the same time, he would not give up all reliance on principles.
That would be analogous to giving up the use of our eyes because
they are not optically perfect. Just as optics attempts to correct our
vision through the determination of myopic or astigmatic errors, so
principles
the law should aim at making its apparently self-evident
32
more useful by showing their necessary limitations.
Behind Cohen's thinking on this question lies a distinction upon
which he insisted in his logical studies. The self-evident principles
of the law are material propositions, that is, they are either factually
true or untrue. They are to be distinguished from formal propositions which assert that it logically follows from, or necessitates as
consequences, certain other propositions. In the case of material
propositions there is always an issue of fact to be settled by evidence.
If we argue that there is no life on Mercury because life cannot exist
except at certain temperatures, it can be answered that on this planet
life has been empirically found to exist between certain temperatures, but in other planets it may be different. But formal propositions are not subject to the test of fact but to the logical test of
30. COHEN, REAsON AD LAw 70 (1950); COHEN, LAW AN THE SOCIAL ORDER
178 (1933).
31. CoHEN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 71.
32. COHEN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 177.
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necessity, which is whether it is or is not possible for the antecedent
to be true and the consequent to be false at the same time. In the
demonstrations of the formal propositions of pure mathematics 2 + 2
= 5 is impossible in any universe in which 2, 5, and = have the
33
meanings assigned in our arithmetic.
In legal theory the controversy over absolutisms comes to its
most precise focus in the issue whether law is a natural phenomenon
or an eternal ideal to which external human conduct ought to conform. Kant is the great exponent of the latter view. The law to him
was not what empirically exists but what is categorically imperative
upon all societies at all times. As instances he gives the property
right of the first occupier, and the duty to execute a murderer. But,
as Cohen has no difficulty in showing, neither of these imperatives
has been able to maintain its absoluteness. His main objection to all
such propositions is that as specific directives they are altogether
arbitrary, that they are norms which happen to prevail among certain
peoples at certain stages, but are set up as valid everywhere for all
times.3 4 While these norms are open to this kind of criticism Cohen
is nonetheless not willing to dispense with them, anymore than he
is with so-called self-evident principles. If properly formulated, they
are ideals of -what ought to be although they are historically conditioned. They are developed from recurrent events and upon estimates
as to the probable effects of certain regulations. The task of the
law is to select certain norms or patterns of conduct and attempt
to repress extreme variations from them. It should be observed
that Cohen's technique here is not, as he saw it, one simply of compromise between irreconcilable opposites. Ultimately it flows from
one of his most cherished principles, the doctrine that opposite categories, like identity and difference, rest and motion, individuality and
35
universality, must always be kept together though never identified.
Much of Cohen's writing was devoted to the criticism of the positivist outlook in science, ethics, politics, history, and jurisprudence.
He rejected altogether the view that since science can deal only with
the facts of existence, judgments of what ought to be are so arbitrary
that no science of norms is possible. In its essence science for him
consists of the formulation of hypotheses based upon the best available knowledge and anticipating new situations which can be experimentally tested so that greater determination can be achieved. This
procedure, he holds, is open to the law. A legal system, he argued,
can achieve the status of a scientific system if adequate hypotheses
as to what is desirable or undesirable, or what is necessary in order
33. COHEN, A PREPACE To LOGIC

6 (1944).

34. Comm, op. cit. supra note 10, at 78.
35. CoHEN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 11.
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to achieve certain ends, are developed.
Some juristic schools insist that by restricting themselves to the
realm of factual or historic existence, and not concerning themselves
with what ought to be, they are thereby making themselves scientific. They possess only the merit, in one of Cohen's favorite phrases
and in his view, of the courage of their confusion. Thus the historical
school began as a reaction against the philosophy of natural rights
with the dogma that the jurist is limited to a description of what
actually happens in legal history and must not impose his own
judgment. This, in turn, led to the conservative natural rights theory,
that is to the glorification of the status quo as desirable. Similarly,
jurists of the type of Duguit and Ardig6, who attempt to restrict the
science of law to the law that is, are in reality crypto-idealists, that is,
the result of their analyses is some idealization of the actual law as
the desirable state that ought to be. 36 Although Cohen had a vast
respect for Holmes' juristic thought he could not associate himself
with the American attempt to develop into a science of law Holmes'
dicta that the law is merely the set of predictions as to what the
courts will decide, and that experience and not logic is the life of
the law. The first fails on the ground, when we are confronted with
the problem of law in the making, that the problem of the court
is not to predict what it will do but to determine how the case should
be decided. Both dicta strictly elaborated would lead to the neglect
of the requirements of consistency in the law. The courts must decide
not only individual cases, but they must develop the legal system so
that there is a clear understanding of rights and duties, what may
or may not be done in recurrent situations.
(3) A developed science is systematic, and in Cohen's view this
is its one essential trait. System is arrived at through the method
of beginning with hypotheses and deducing conclusions, and then
comparing these conclusions with the factual world. By the use of
deduction we are able to develop the implications of propositions
and thus find out their true meaning; it helps us to make our assumptions explicit and this makes possible a critical attitude towards them.
It enables us to deal not only with the actual, but also with the possible. This latter takes us into the field of possibility where there are
to be found many things better than the actual.38
This view of science and scientific method, which Cohen defended
vigorously all his life, may seem today somewhat antiquated when
put beside the current highly sophisticated studies. It is rejected by
those who maintain that science is purely inductive, that is that
36. CoHEN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 188.
37. CoEN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 78.
38. CoHEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 106.
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principles and laws are discovered through an analysis of given
particulars. In substance Cohen's answer to this position is that
we do not know what particulars to look for unless we have an
hypothesis to guide us. Data do not speak for themselves. Their
meaning and their significance are discoverable only with the aid
of critical assumptions. Cohen's view of science is rejected also by
those who maintain that deduction and induction are both part of
science. But Cohen was not prepared to rule out induction altogether. Its function in science is the establishment through enumeration of the material truth of propositions. For this reason the
evidence for universal propositions is never conclusive, it can never
be more than probable. In deductive reasoning, however, the inferences are necessary, although they may be materially false. In
the current treatments of the subject, apart from those with a strictly
positivist approach, Cohen's view is taken for granted. It is the
classical one in the sense that it is of great antiquity. There is a
tendency to pass over the elements of scientific method, as he isolated
them, without discussion, not because they are irrelevant, but because
the discussion of them has gone far enough. Interest has shifted to
the minutiae and interstices of the process, and is becoming inextricably intermingled with epistemology, the mathematics of probability,
linguistics, and symbolic logic. For Cohen's attempt, however, to
get at the meaning of the law, the elements of scientific method,
as he set them forth, were sufficient for that purpose. While physics
and legal phenomena are both amenable to scientific treatment, in
Cohen's sense, the level of examination of the two subjects differs
conspicuously.
Professor Northrop has labeled Cohen's views and those of his
son Felix as instances of "intuitive ethical jurisprudence" and, while
he finds they possess some merits, he concludes they are ultimately
"barren ethically and legally." 39 Intuitive ethical jurisprudence turns
on the root idea of "justice" or "the good life." The approach suffers
from two defects, in Professor Northrop's opinion. The notion of "the
good life," unless its meaning is made concrete, does not assist the
judge in deciding which of two moral principles shall prevail in
cases where they are in conflict. In addition, if the Cohen jurisprudence provided the means by which such a criterion could be
determined it would be false to its own premise. Where the ethical
is taken as a primitive or irreducible concept, an applicable criterion
would result in the ethical losing its primitive status and being definable in terms of the concepts specifying the criterion.
Because of the obscurity in the thought of some philosophers there
39. NORTHROP, THE

COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE

69 (1959).
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is room for different interpretations of their position, and disputes
about their "true" points of view are usually vain. But this is not the
case with Cohen. His style is clear and his meaning generally evident. Where there are obscurities it is because the problem has not
been resolved or, in his opinion, is unresolvable, and he will then,
in order to avoid a decision, use words of great generality which
carry too many ideas to be acceptable to the precise approach of
much of contemporary philosophy.
We may put aside Professor Northrop's association of Morris and
Felix Cohen's thought on this issue since Morris Cohen himself,
while his attitude was sympathetic, believed that his son had
attempted an impossible task in the ethical field. The senior Cohen
believed in "the good life" as distinguished from "life." This in part
was a protest against the romantic use of such terms as "ife,"
"experience," and "reality." His plea was for discrimination and it
was, he believed, the task of rational philosophy to define the good,
40
the true, and the beautiful.
His narrow point is in substance teleologic. Of the possible .decisions open to the judge who is concerned with what is right, he
must choose the one which best serves the interest of the community. He does this by determining, as best he may, the ends most
advantageous to the community and the decision most likely to
reach them.41 Since it is possible for moral decisions to be mistaken,
the problem is to discover the distinction in such cases between
the true and the false. We do this dialectically and empirically by
developing the consequences of rival propositions. Cohen recognized
that the results more often than not are provisional and merely
probable, and he answers that we must learn to live in an uncertain
world. This may seem to both idealists and empiricists an unduly
naive treatment of a vastly difficult problem but, in any case, Cohen
is here making a serious effort to meet the concrete requirements of
the legal order.
The type of deductive system that Cohen contemplated for the
law was one that permitted many legal rules to be derived from a
few principles. This would increase both the certainty arid the
consistency of the law. By certainty he meant not a psychological
feeling about a given proposition but a logical ground on which
its claim to truth could be founded. Certainty in the law is essential
to its usefulness; it increases the degree to which it is readily knowable and this in turn facilitates transactions by strengthening reliance
40. COHEN, op. cit. supranote 6, at 457.

41. COHEN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 246. Cohen's thought here is close to
that of G. E. Moore and the English utilitarians. See MOORE, PINCIPIA
ETHICA, ch. v. (1903).
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on the future. Consistency in the law is necessary if the law is to
maintain its prestige. In every law suit the expectation of at least
one party is defeated. Nevertheless, a persistent and conspicuous
effort at impartiality which is most effectively promoted by a
genuine devotion to scientific method will impress even the defeated
party. Admittedly science is abstract. It places its emphasis on
abstract considerations and is concerned with the definable classes
rather than with the particular cases. But it forces us to see things
from a wider point of view and to make us more just to the diversity
of human interest.4
This was Cohen's answer to those who urged experience as the
basis of law at one extreme and to conceptually mechanical jurisprudence at the other. He held that whatever else law may be it is
instituted to promote the good life, but experience without logical
vision is stupid and brutish and supplies no guide to the good life.
Law that is not logical is like prescientific medicine, a hodge-podge
of sense and superstitution. At the other end of the scale the so-called
strong judge assumes that the law always consists of theoretically
simple cases, whereas the concrete case is complex because it generally involves many principles. Cohen thought that judges who
follow principles regardless of consequences were simply too lazy to
examine countervailing considerations which were relevant to the
43
application of the principles.
His espousal of system in the law did not mean he believed that
the law is most fruitfully developed by deduction or syllogisms. Notwithstanding the powerful influence of deduction in the law, in the
main it supplies, in his metaphor, the tracks rather than the motive
power of the legal train. The primary motive power is the insight44
which extends our knowledge. There are limitations even to reason.
Behind Cohen's theory of scientific method was a philosophic
view of the world into the details of which we need not enter. It
was consistently maintained and was derived in considerable part
from Cohen's studies in mathematics and logic at the turn of the
century. He once gave a brief summary of his position as follows:
I am a rationalist in believing that reason is a genuine and significant
phase of nature; but I am an irrationalist in insisting that nature contains
more than reason. I am a mystic in holding that all words point to a
realm of being deeper and wider than the words themselves. But I reject
as vicious obscurantism all efforts to describe the indescribable. I reject
the euthanasia or suicide of thought involved in all monisms which identify the whole totality of things with matter, mind, or any other element
42. CoHEN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 194. For Cohen's answer to Jerome

Frank's denial of certainty in the law see id. at 358.
43. Id. at 196.
44. Id. at 145.
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in it. But I also reject the common dualism which conceives the mind
and the external world as confronting each other like two mutually
exclusive spatial bodies. I believe in the Aristotelian distinction between
matter and form. But I am willing to be called a materialist if that means
one who disbelieves in disembodied spirits; and I should refer to spiritists

who localize disembodied spirits in space as crypto-materialists. However,
I should also call myself an idealist, not in the perverse modern sense
which applies that term to nominalists like Berkeley who reject real
ideas, but in the Platonic sense according to which ideas, ideals, or abstract
universals are the conditions of real existence, and not mere fictions of
the human mind. 45

For good measure he added, in terms of current values, that he
might seem to be out of touch with what was modern and useful,
and yet made no wholehearted plea for the old. He believed in
chance and spontaneity in physics, and law and mechanism in life.

He had no respect for experience, induction, the dynamic, evolution, progress, behaviorism, and pychoanalysis; he did not line up
with either the orthodox or revolutionary party in politics, morals
or religion, although he wrote on those themes. He owed no allegiance to the democratic dogma. 46 He claimed to offer no practical
message to the man engaged in the affairs of life, and was satisfied to
appear to be concerned with purely contemplative surveys of existence.

47

Stated thus baldly many of those beliefs were profoundly irritating
to some of his contemporaries. To Cohen, who enjoyed controversy,
this was of no moment. He was sustained through all the vicissitudes

of his life by a profound faith in philosophy itself. Its highest function was to give men strength to envisage the truth. In his view this
was a much greater good than the perpetual motion without any
definite direction which modernists regard as the blessed life.48
V

Cohen's interest in the application of law in the social realm was
as intense as his concern with the philosophy of law. In his view the
basic legal institutions partly maintained the existing social order
and also partly blocked the road to a better one. He wrote numerous
articles on this aspect of the law, all of them at the least tinged with
his technical philosophical outlook. He wrote no trade articles of the
usual law review type. He was, however, a close reader of the im45. COHEN, Op. cit. supranote 6, at xii.
46. Id. at 6.

47. Id. at xiii.
48. ARiSTOE, NIcHOMaAcnEAN ETmcS, bk. v, ch. 10 (Ross transl., McKeon
ed., Modern Library, 1947). For the most extensive, incisive criticism of
Cohen's general position from the empirical point of view see Yntema, The
Rational Basis of Legal Science, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 925 (1931). For Cohen's
trenchant reply see op. cit. supra note 18, beginning at 219.
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portant labor and constitutional decisions and of the great texts, and
he kept abreast of developments in certain other major fields. When
necessary his articles could be supported with citations worthy of
the most learned law professor. While he was occupied with this
approach to the law he adopted the sane course of talking about it
in the sense in which the word is used by judges, lawyers and in
the law schools, i.e., as referring to the rules of conduct determinable
by courts.
His principal effort in this field was his examination of what he
termed "the process of judicial legislation." In the American popular
mind, with its deeply inbred tradition of the doctrine of the separation of powers, the phrase is a derogatory one. Cohen's thoughts on
the subject were first put on paper in 1913 when labor problems were
very much to the fore in the courts, and judges, in denying relief
in patently unjust situations, were taking refuge in the customary
arguments that they were merely applying and not making the law.
It is still an epithet today as in the criticism of Brown v. Board of
Education4 9 and other major decisions.
We can eliminate this aspect of the problem if we ask whether it
is true or false (a) that courts sometimes provide a rule where there
was no rule before; and (b) that they sometimes provide a new rule
in place of- an existing one. Cohen's argument unhesitatingly pronounces both of these propositions to be true. How else, he inquires,
if judges never made law, could the body of rules known as the
common law ever have arisen or have undergone the changes which
it has.50 When we are in the presence of cases of first impression,
where we have no clear precedent, he denied that judges find the
law. He argued that in the decisions of the great creative minds in
legal history, decisions of the kind written by Mansfield, Gibson, or
Shaw, we find that the prevailing ideas of justice, public convenience,
and what is "reasonable," are always appealed to as conclusive. But
these moral rules or considerations of public convenience do not of
themselves have the force of law. They are transformed into legal
rules only when courts, balancing the relevant considerations, decide
to enforce them. There can thus be no doubt that by direct judicial
legislation, based on supposed principles of justice, that the law of
quasi-contract, the common counts, the law of boycott, and other
divisions have been developed. Similarly the interpretation of statutes is a form of judicial legislation. The meaning of a statute is a
juridical creation in the light of social demands. The court decides
not so much what the legislature actually intended, nor what the
49. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
50. CoHEN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 112.
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words of a statute ordinarily mean, but what the public, taking all
the circumstances of the case into account, should act on. Finally,
even the application of laws can be a mode of law-making. This
situation arises when two or more different rules seem applicable and
the court must determine which is to prevail. A Board of Health
has authority by statute to make such regulations as are necessary
for the preservation of public health from impending disaster. The
Board of Health quarantines a person who refuses to be vaccinated,
thereby interfering with his liberty. In the court's view there is no
doubt that the legislature has power to authorize measures for public
health; but also that enactments which affect the liberty of the person
are to be strictly construed. Which should prevail? In such cases
there are few legal rules which offer sensible guidance.
In essence this is Cohen's theory of judicial review which, however, has not won complete acceptance. It is certain that Cohen is on
the soundest of grounds in maintaining that the unprovided case is
a not unfamiliar phenomenon in the courts. Actually, according to
Allen, 51 there are an astonishing number of such specimens and,
what is even more remarkable, some fairly recent ones not infrequently involve issues which it might be supposed were settled generations ago, e.g., can a blind man witness a will; is the owner of
straying cattle liable for personal injury done by his animals to the
occupier of the land on which they trespassed? In the decision of
such cases courts will admit that they are handling matters of first
impression, but they attempt to reach their conclusions by analogy,
by the general course of past decisions, by a declaration of changed
conditions, by deduction from amorphous general principles, and by
other means for which Cohen had only scorn. Nevertheless, while
he claimed that judges do and must make law, he admitted that it
would be absurd to maintain that they can make any law they
please. He attempted to dispose of this point by arguing that this
is also true of the legislature and that the difference is one of degree
and not of kind.52 Cohen's position at bottom rests on a strictly
logical point: Was the rule of law announced by the court recognized as prevailing before the decision? If not, then the court has
legislated. Putting aside the meaning of the question-begging word
"recognized," there is here a division between other systems of law
and the Anglo-American. In Switzerland, for example, the Code
states that when there is no authority the judge in the last resort
should apply the rule which he would establish if he were acting as
legislator, a device borrowed from Aristotle.s Legal historians no
51. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MIAKiNG 291 (6th
52. COHEN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 146.

ed. 1958).

53. ARISTOTLE, NICHOw-Ac-CEiN ETHICs, bk. v, ch. 10 (Ross transl., McKeon

ed., Modern Library, 1947).
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longer doubt that the bulk of the common law throughout its history
was consciously laid down as such by the courts, however much
'judicial opinions may indicate to the contrary. As a logician, and
as a man deeply concerned with political and economic issues, Cohen
was affronted because the courts declared they were doing one thing
when in fact they were doing the precise opposite. Nevertheless this
is, and always has been, the practice of the courts, however specious
their arguments in support of previous "recognition" of the rule
may be in particular cases. In this they are supported by the bulk of
text writers with arguments of considerable subtlety. Perhaps the
failure to avow frankly what is logically the case may be part of
an effort to show the reasonableness of new rules and otherwise to
enhance their prestige. In any case, logic here is in direct conflict
with the Holmesian doctrine of life and experience, and no one has
yet succeeded in uniting them in this sphere.
In modern times the rise of the social betterment state was accompanied by a radical shift in the classical theories of contract which
Cohen was quick to note. His paper included a useful criticism of
the various theories which attempt to justify contract law, and he
endeavored to sift the valid from the invalid elements in them. At
their core, however, they were individualistic theories of contract in
the sense that they were based on, or associated with, the notion of
contractual liberty. Their cardinal error, in Cohen's view, was that
they assumed that the law did nothing but put into effect what had
been agreed upon by the contracting parties.54 In fact, contract law
plays a positive role in social life as we see when the organized force
of the state is brought into play to compel the loser of a suit to pay
or to do something. In this sense contract law is a branch of public
law. This idea, which had gone much further in Europe than it had
in America when Cohen published his paper in 1933, leaves little
room for the individualist idea of the binding force of promises. If
contract is to be linked with sovereignty by conferring the power
of the state upon one of the parties to the contract, then Cohen
thought we should inquire into the purposes and circumstances under
which that power may be conferred. We must be certain that the
power of the state is not used for unconscionable purposes, particularly against those in dire need. This view touches the nerve of
the political philosophy behind the idea of the social betterment state,
a theory which is on the march but which still awaits its effective
exposition. There is no question, however, but that Cohen was in
the forefront of those who foresaw the development of the new
contract law.
54. CoHEN, op. cit. supra

note 18, at 103.
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Cohen also published a notable paper on private property in 1927,
in which his line of argument followed that of his analysis of contract. Property is rooted in custom, in economic needs, and in individual needs for privacy. But it is only one among many human
interests, and it cannot be pursued absolutely without detriment to
human life. It is therefore not sacrosanct. The issue is not its maintenance or abolition, but the precise determination of the areas in
which private enterprise may be given free scope and where it must
55
be restricted for the common good.
He wrote on various other topics where the law impinged directly
upon the social order, from the criminal law to clericalism. He was
imbued with a deep sense of social justice, but he was not swayed
by sentimental predilections. His ideal was an order of just social
relations, and he never wearied of insisting that the necessary condition for such an achievement was the most rigorous intellectual
integrity and a concentration on seeing the facts as they are. The
key to his outlook in all his writings is to be found in his point of
view rather than in any particular set of doctrines. Very simply,
as he made clear on many occasions, it is the position which claims
for itself the right to question all plausible and self-evident propositions, not for the purpose of refuting them, but to determine the
evidence that supports them rather than their possible alternatives.
VI
His figure was slight, with the appearance of fragility, but actually
wiry, and topped by a head of magnificent proportions. He was five
feet seven inches in heightwith black, curly hair and keen bluishhazel eyes. His manner was gentle, sympathetic, even humorous,
but there was an unmistakable firmness lurking just below the surface. He wrote during the most active period in jurisprudence that
the United States has ever known. Holmes' influence was pervasive
and Cohen had close and affectionate relations with him. But there
were many other men who made their mark during the same period
-Pound, Cardozo, Frankfurter, Cook, Yntema, Llewellyn, Oliphant,
Arnold, Frank, and his own son Felix, to name but a few; altogether
they brought legal thought to a level worthy of comparison with the
best from Europe, and easily surpassing that of England. Although
his formal training in the law was small, his equipment philosophically for his studies in jurisprudence was immense, and he drew with
sureness for illuminating help from philosophy, logic, the social
sciences, and physics. He was a brave and effective public speaker,
and a teacher whose classroom was often stretched beyond its
55. Id. at 57.
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capacity. It was the rule when he appeared on the program of meetings of the American Philosophical Association to place him last in
order to help assure a full attendance at the sessions. The diversity
of his interests was as wide as that of Leibniz and his mastery of
them brought him the respect here and abroad of men concerned
with the roots of things. He once remarked that in his youth he
coined a beatitude which in later years he still found of some
use: "Blessed are they who are not modest; they shall not need any
devices to call attention to themselves and to their modesty." But
notwithstanding his great erudition his approach always remained
Socratic. His close friend and pupil, Sidney Hook, has written that
he had heard Cohen say "I do not know" more often than any other
person he had known. 56
Cohen died in 1947 with five of the numerous books he had planned
published. Since that time others have appeared. If he did not live
to finish his life's work, he accomplished more than is given to most
scholars who teach and participate in the numerous public activities
that marked his career. Cohen was not a hopeful man and he would
not be attracted by the thought, he once said in conversation, of living life over again-particularly, he added after a pause, if he had
to teach mathematics to college students. He was disturbed above
everything else by the decline of faith in the sense of rationality
or logical connection of nature. He was certainly the chief critical
philosopher the United States has known. No other mind in the
history of American thought has devoted itself with such acuteness
and clarity to the exposition of the necessary assumptions which lie
behind the branches of inquiry. Nevertheless the positive goal was
always steadily before his gaze: To restore philosophia to her proper
place as against the prevailing moods of scepticism and philomathia.
56. A
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